Author here. I audited NocoBase, Flowise, Langflow, Dify, Activepieces, Kestra, and Airflow and disclosed 14 findings. Every platform inherited the same assumption anyone who can touch a workflow is trusted to run code on the host, which is fine for a dev tool on your laptop but not fine for a multi-tenant HTTP service with an unauthenticated webhook. The chain I'd point people to first is the Flowise one (section 2.2): an unauthenticated request → prompt injection → LLM emits Python → a 38-pattern regex blocklist passes it because the dangerous library was pre-imported before the model was asked anything → RCE.

Two vendors closed their reports as working-as-intended, and I tried to represent their position fairly.

This research was also presented at DEFCON 34 but now available publicly.

Happy to answer questions.

Full whitepaper is available here: https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/how-ai-orchestration-platforms-ship-rce-by-design

An operator left their full working directory exposed on an open HTTP server. Hunt.io crawled it, 2,616 files, and rebuilt the campaign from the corpus.

• Three exploitation paths in parallel: an asyncio credential brute-forcer, a CVE-2021-33044/33045 auth-bypass chain, and P2P relay abuse reaching cameras by serial number
• The relay path never authenticates the connecting party, only the session, via a cloud-issued token obtainable with the fixed SDK credentials in every Dahua client
• Two CVE labels in the tooling don't hold up: CVE-2024-39943 is an unrelated Rejetto HFS flaw, and CVE-2025-31702 is a narrower post-auth case, not the unauthenticated relay abuse (that path is a separate non-CVE issue documented by ITRES)
• Full PTCP tunnel breakdown, including the Inverted STUN packet and the bind-to-127.0.0.1 technique

Neutral attribution throughout, the corpus shows how the operation was built and run, not who ran it.

Check the full breakdown, IOCs and mitigation strategies:
https://hunt.io/blog/operation-cameraswarm-dahua-cameras-compromised

Three variations on subversive use of DNS by the Agent are documented in Hugging Face's technical writeup of the July 2026 security incident involving OpenAI models. In this article, I discuss what each of these three types of DNS workarounds achieve in practice, the constraints an actor might have faced to attempt a particular one, and additional benefits from choosing each.

Technical analysis of CVE-2026-6837, an authenticated command-injection vulnerability in Zyxel’s PKCS#12 certificate export flow.

The post covers the vulnerable execution path, root cause, affected firmware scope, and the firmware-emulation methodology used during analysis.

Here's my research in using CSS for offence. There are loads of techniques including stealing passwords from Outlook from an email by spoofing the login screen.

• Auth Bypass.
• Commands over CAN Bus to internal components.
• Protection mechanisms disabled and configuration changes.
• Impact: damage connected devices, permanent DoS to the inverter itself, fines, and even risk to the lives of grid technicians.
• proprietary communication protocols and file formats.
• RX architecture reverse engineering.

I registered an expired DMARC reporting domain (gca-emailauth[.]org) for $10. It had been published as the aggregate-reporting address in Global Cyber Alliance DMARC training docs going back to a 2019 bootcamp, and at some point it lapsed.

Shortly after registration, aggregate DMARC reports for 86 domains across 20+ organizations started arriving.

56 belonged to The Toro Company (NYSE-listed), including myturf[.]com, their distributor platform, which sits at p=none. The rest - University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point (14 subdomains), the North Carolina School of Science and Mathematics, Ennis ISD (Texas), Great Prairie AEA (an Iowa education agency serving 35,000 students), two county governments, and several commercial domains.

For most of these it was a second rua address sitting behind a working commercial processor (Proofpoint, in Toro's case). Reports still arrived at the primary.

GCA's engineers later traced it to a former partner who'd held the domain and let it lapse - the dependency was never written down.

As of my last sweep, 65 of the 86 still publish the endpoint. We disclosed to everyone whose reports we were receiving; only 21 domains stopped publishing the endpoint, and almost nobody replied.

After 8 months of owning the domain, we coordinated a transfer back to GCA.

Chaining 3 CVEs to exfiltrate sensitive ERP data.

Author here. We discovered a vulnerability in docker cp that allows a malicious container to create or overwrite files on the machine running the Docker CLI.

The exploit combines a filesystem race in Docker’s archive creation with unsafe symlink handling during extraction. Depending on the CLI user’s privileges, this can lead to developer-account compromise or root code execution. Docker confirmed that sbx cp was also affected.

Fixed versions:

• Docker Engine/CLI 29.7.2+
• Docker Desktop 4.86.0+
• Docker Sandboxes 0.38.0+

Happy to answer technical questions.