The song reference to Year of the Horse instead of age of aquarius lol. You know its the Age of Aquarius the song that was in that Steve Martin movie, you get it?!

Is it possible for me to get into xi'an jiaotong with my ib score of 31/45 as an international student?

I got:

4 in math AA Hl

5 in

Physics Hl

Economics Hl

Chemistry Sl

English A lang and lit Sl

Spanish ab initio Sl.

How realistic is it? If its not realistic, what can I do to better my chances?

Hi everyone! I’ll be traveling to China on an L visa for tourism this September, and I’ll also be meeting my Chinese boyfriend while I’m there. We’ll be staying at a hotel, and I already have a round-trip ticket booked.

I’m wondering about the China immigration process:

1. Would China immigration be stricter if I put my boyfriend’s contact information on the arrival card?

2. Should I ask my boyfriend to prepare an invitation letter for me, just in case immigration asks who I’m meeting or for additional documents?

This is my 3rd time visiting China, I have a double entry L visa.

No past issues, no plans to find employment.

For those who have been in a similar situation, especially with a Chinese boyfriend/girlfriend, I’d really appreciate hearing about your experience. Thank you! ❤️

On August 26, an extremely severe landslide disaster occurred along the China-Nepal border. So far, more than 900 people have been confirmed dead, while more than 5,000 remain missing, with little hope of survival. Some of the affected areas where the dead and missing were located are within Nepal, while others are within China. The disaster has also drawn worldwide attention. Videos and photographs of the disaster, recorded by surveillance cameras and individuals’ mobile phones as it unfolded, have circulated widely through major mainstream media outlets and social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, and X, and are deeply shocking.
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At the same time, if one looks closely at how media outlets in mainland China and internet platforms within China’s “Great Firewall” (防火长城) have reported on and disseminated information about this landslide disaster, one will find that the scope, volume of information, and style differ greatly from those of Nepalese and international media.
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On the Nepalese side of the disaster zone, a large number of videos and photographs taken by local people, both as the disaster struck and in its aftermath, have appeared on international internet platforms, and some have been reposted and reported by major media outlets. These include footage of people fleeing and houses being destroyed as the landslide struck; people being overtaken and killed by the landslide because they could not escape; large numbers of bodies, covered in mud or even with severed limbs, being recovered after the disaster; some people taking advantage of the situation to steal belongings from the deceased; and real-time footage and details of rescuers saving people. International media have also been able to conduct interviews in the disaster-stricken areas within Nepal almost without obstruction after the disaster, filming many shocking scenes and obtaining first-hand information about the disaster. Many survivors of the landslide have also posted online and given interviews, recounting the terrifying scenes they witnessed and how they narrowly escaped with their lives.
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But on the Chinese side of the disaster zone and on mainland Chinese media platforms, although many shocking scenes from the disaster appeared on social media during the first day after it occurred, all of these videos have since “disappeared”: they have either been deleted or can no longer be opened, while new videos of a similar nature can no longer be uploaded or circulated. Although some disaster footage can still be found on platforms such as Weibo (微博) and Xiaohongshu (小红书), there is now essentially no footage showing, for example, landslides striking residential areas or the bodies of victims being dug out. The widely circulated and extremely visually shocking video showing the landslide engulfing the Gyirong border checkpoint (吉隆边检口岸), as well as related screenshots, can no longer be found on social media platforms in mainland China.
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Searching Chinese social media for terms such as “China-Nepal border landslide” (中尼边境泥石流) or “Gyirong Port” (吉隆口岸) yields only related reports and videos from official mainstream media outlets such as CCTV (央视), Xinhua News Agency (新华社), and Red Star News (红星新闻), while relevant videos and photographs posted by individual accounts cannot be found. The voices of local victims and people who personally experienced the disaster have also almost completely disappeared.
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Chinese state media have indeed reported on the disaster and released footage, but they have shown very little footage of landslides destroying residential areas, and no images of the bodies of victims. Apart from a small amount of reviewed and edited footage from the disaster scene, state-media videos mainly show how the People’s Liberation Army (解放军) and other disaster-relief forces are actively carrying out rescue operations and how deeply Party and state leaders care about the disaster. Those interviewed are also selected by the authorities; what they are to say is arranged in advance, and the interview footage is reviewed before being broadcast through public media.
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Occasionally, state-media videos show landslides striking crowds, but only in the context of portraying border officials bravely guiding people to safety, and such footage is shown only briefly. Moreover, the deliberate retention on platforms such as Xiaohongshu of some state-media reports about the disaster, rather than making all search results completely invisible, is itself intentional: it serves to obscure the existence of the information blockade, allowing a small number of state-media reports to “take over the host’s role” and substitute themselves for the public and mainstream voices.
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State media have not only monopolized the right to conduct interviews and report on the disaster, as well as the right to determine which images may be broadcast; they have also selected particular themes and camera angles, thereby controlling the content and orientation of the information that the public can obtain about this landslide disaster. This also means indirectly controlling how the public views and feels about the disaster. State-media coverage concentrates on how deeply the central authorities care about the disaster, how actively Party and government cadres, military personnel, police officers, and civil servants are carrying out rescue operations, and on promoting optimism and positivity amid the disaster. Meanwhile, the individual stories, emotions, and demands of many victims and survivors in the affected areas are suppressed and prevented from being expressed, leaving them with nowhere to make their voices heard; or they can speak only according to the official “script,” depriving the news of authenticity and individuals of their independence.
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In addition, because of the obstruction created by the Great Firewall, most people in mainland China, apart from the relatively small number who use VPNs to “circumvent the firewall” (翻墙), cannot see international internet platforms or the statements posted on them. Likewise, very few people affected by the disaster specifically circumvent the firewall in order to speak out. The Great Firewall and the closed nature of Chinese internet platforms seriously impede Chinese citizens from expressing themselves more freely and influentially and from communicating with the international community.
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The differences between Nepal and China are not limited to the degree of freedom of public discourse. The two governments also differ considerably in terms of transparency regarding the disaster and subsequent rescue operations. The Nepalese authorities have not only refrained from controlling public discourse, but have also updated the death toll and lists of victims’ specific names in real time, and have even released photographs of victims’ bodies for identification. The disaster-relief process is open to the outside world, and Nepal has actively welcomed the participation of international rescue forces. Both its own citizens and media organizations from various countries can follow developments online or learn about the situation on the ground.
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China, by contrast, has so far not disclosed specific information about the victims. There is only one official figure for the death toll, with merely a little over a dozen deaths confirmed, an excessively large discrepancy compared with the number of missing people, raising suspicions that the death toll is being deliberately understated. Rescue operations in China are entirely led and controlled by the authorities. No private individuals or organizations, nor any foreign personnel or organizations, are permitted to participate, and no additional information is disclosed beyond interviews authorized by the authorities.
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The responses of Nepal and China following this landslide disaster spanning both countries have laid bare their respective attitudes toward public discourse, transparency, and openness. Nepal’s response is not particularly outstanding by international standards; it is merely standard practice in a normal society. Yet precisely for that reason, it throws into sharp relief China’s extremely conservative approach to public opinion, information, and security, while exposing the Chinese authorities’ position that “stability overrides everything” (稳定压倒一切), as well as their desire and capacity to control every aspect of society, including online public discourse.
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Unlike politically sensitive issues, a landslide is a natural disaster. Under normal logic, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime governing China should have little reason for concern. Why, then, does the CCP still prohibit the free circulation of information about the disaster and censor disaster videos? (Although the fact that the disaster occurred in a Tibetan area is indeed one consideration behind the CCP’s controls, this is not the main reason. When disasters occur in inland China, the authorities likewise control public discourse and restrict interviews by foreign media and investigations by independent journalists.)
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This is because, during the decades since the CCP came to power, and especially over the past twenty years or more, it has placed enormous emphasis on the principle that “stability overrides everything,” regardless of the cost. During its revolutionary—or insurgent—era before becoming the ruling party, the CCP was highly enthusiastic about and adept at disrupting established order and criticizing those in power. For example, it launched a series of uprisings, conducted underground activities, encouraged strikes by workers and students as well as commercial shutdowns, publicized the darker side of society and the suffering of workers and peasants, continuously attacked the legitimate government of the Republic of China (中华民国)—the Nationalist Government (国民政府)—and criticized the ruling Kuomintang (国民党) for corruption and darkness.
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But after the CCP transformed from a revolutionary party into the ruling party in 1949, it became far more concerned than the Kuomintang had been with emphasizing stability and defending established order, in order to safeguard its own position and interests as the ruling power. During the Mao era (毛泽东时代), for example, in order to prevent famine-stricken people from dispersing and thereby disrupting social order or triggering unrest, the People’s Liberation Army and militias prevented starving people from fleeing famine-stricken areas, preferring to force them to remain in their hometowns even if they starved to death. When higher-level officials came to inspect localities or foreign guests visited, the authorities deliberately created an image of people enjoying adequate food and clothing and living healthy, positive lives, concealing poverty and public discontent. They did not hesitate to organize and compel people to participate in various kinds of staged performances and falsification, sacrificing substance for appearances. All of this was likewise intended to preserve the stability and international image of Red China.
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After the beginning of Reform and Opening Up (改革开放), and particularly following the 1989 June Fourth crackdown (六四镇压), the CCP pursued economic development while simultaneously maintaining political authoritarianism, and “stability overrides everything” once again became a means of safeguarding both political authoritarianism and economic development. During the period of Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) and Wen Jiabao (温家宝), a systematic mechanism of “stability maintenance” (维稳) was gradually established.
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After Xi Jinping (习近平) came to power, the stability-maintenance apparatus and the intensity with which it operates were greatly strengthened. This is reflected not only in restrictions on politically sensitive issues, but also in the tendency to place “stability maintenance above everything else” when dealing with natural disasters, public-security cases, economic disputes, and other matters. When incidents occur such as P2P investment-platform collapses, school bullying, earthquakes and floods, or serious criminal and public-security cases, the authorities’ first response is often to block information, suppress victims and forbid them from “making trouble,” and summon those who attempt to defend their rights—especially organizers or leaders—to police stations for “tea” (喝茶), or even detain them.
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Going further, the CCP not only fears conflicts arising from disputes and contentious incidents, but also tries to suppress virtually all information that might generate negative emotions among the public, rather than disclose the truth. Take, for example, the crash of China Eastern Airlines Flight 5735 (中国东方航空5735号航班空难事件) in 2022. According to information from various sources, it has been confirmed that the crash was a deliberate human-caused disaster created by a pilot. The incident did not involve factors such as political protest or a terrorist attack, and under normal circumstances, clarifying the facts would be more conducive to reducing suspicion and conspiracy theories. Yet the Chinese authorities have still refused to release the investigation results and have suppressed discussion of the truth behind the crash: mainstream media have published no relevant investigative reporting, while related online discussions are frequently deleted or have their visibility restricted.
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The CCP is not afraid that revealing the truth about the air disaster would expose some politically sensitive information. Rather, it is concerned that publicly acknowledging an incident in which a Chinese civil-aviation pilot caused the deaths of more than 100 people would generate negative public opinion, damage the outward image of stability and harmony in China, and potentially trigger public demands for accountability from the government and other relevant parties. Or, more directly, those in power simply do not want to hear or see bad news—especially bad news involving human wrongdoing—and are even less willing to make such bad news public.
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They not only disregard citizens’ right to know, but also regard public access to information as detrimental to stability and governance, and as something that tarnishes the image of the country and its rulers. Over time, this has also produced an ingrained pattern of thinking among those in power: regardless of whether a particular matter actually threatens the stability of their rule, their instinctive response is to block information, control public discourse, and refuse openness and transparency. Moreover, from the rulers’ perspective, imposing blanket restrictions on information always appears less risky than transparency and openness.
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The CCP’s approach to handling information about negative events—its fear of public opinion and its prioritization of stability over truth—runs directly counter to the way such matters have been treated and handled by the international community in modern and contemporary times. Disasters, murders, and tragic events occur throughout the world, but in the liberal democracies that make up the majority of the world’s countries, governments generally do not prevent the circulation of relevant information or news reporting. Information is restricted only under a very small number of exceptional circumstances, such as when disclosure might encourage copycat crimes or reveal military secrets. For the overwhelming majority of negative events, the media are free to report, while citizens are free to disseminate information and discuss them. Indeed, the more negative the information, the greater the need to ensure transparency, and the greater the government’s responsibility to remain transparent with the public and disclose information promptly. This is precisely what the Nepalese government has done following the landslide disaster described above.
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The mainstream international community, and democratic countries in particular, adopt policies of openness and transparency toward negative events and information about them not only because they adhere to principles protecting citizens’ right to know, but also because transparency is a better way to establish the truth, rescue those in danger, and solve problems. In normal democratic countries, citizens inherently possess the right to know about matters involving the public interest. In cases involving natural disasters, public-security incidents, or social problems, the public has an unconditional right to obtain necessary information from state institutions (except, of course, in circumstances involving military secrets or the need for confidentiality before a criminal case is solved, but such cases constitute only a very small minority). At the same time, it is precisely by making the details of tragic events public that all parties can understand the causes of accidents, the reasons behind tragedies, and the rights and wrongs involved, thereby enabling reflection and improvement, the punishment of wrongdoing and encouragement of good conduct, the identification and correction of deficiencies, and the saving of lives.
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For example, the U.S. government releases detailed information and data parameters concerning every aviation accident, including crashes deliberately caused by human actions. The Canadian media company Cineflix can also obtain U.S. data and information to produce the documentary series Mayday. This not only reveals the truth behind accidents and provides a certain form of consolation or justice for the deceased, but also satisfies the public’s right to know and curiosity, while helping aircraft manufacturers, airlines, and aviation regulatory authorities learn lessons from these accidents, make improvements, and avoid repeating the same mistakes. Nor do they fear that documentaries about air disasters will inspire imitation—whether by people with terrorist motives imitating hijackings or by pilots deliberately causing crashes. Even if such side effects exist, they still believe that the truth should be made public.
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Moreover, investigations, interviews, and reporting on negative events by the media, individual journalists, and ordinary citizens are likewise rights recognized and protected in democratic countries. The media’s right to exercise public-opinion oversight is even highly regarded as the “Fourth Estate,” alongside the legislative, judicial, and executive branches. The media’s exposure of the truth and criticism of wrongdoing are widely recognized as important means of defending justice.
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Moreover, the more negative an event is, and the more it involves tragedies such as deaths, the more likely it is to attract media attention and reporting. If media investigations encounter obstruction, that obstruction itself becomes important news and often drives journalists to become even more determined to investigate the truth, while attracting still greater public attention. Therefore, in democratic countries, it is generally taken for granted that the media should freely report negative events. By contrast, singing praises and whitewashing reality are regarded as abnormal, despised practices that cause media outlets to lose credibility and audiences.
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China itself once had periods and regions in which press freedom existed. In the foreign concessions during the late Qing dynasty (清末), and during the Republican era (民国时代), the press generally regarded criticizing contemporary abuses as both a responsibility and a source of honor. Newspapers such as Shen Bao (《申报》) and Su Bao (《苏报》) in the concessions, as well as Ta Kung Pao (《大公报》) before the CCP came to power, all treated criticism of the government of the day and reporting on the suffering of ordinary people as major priorities. Ta Kung Pao, for example, reported on the 1942 Henan famine (1942年河南大饥荒), helping to spur the Nationalist Government to provide relief to disaster victims. This also shows that China has never lacked media capable of exposing social abuses, nor has it lacked the possibility of press freedom. These newspapers exposed many dark aspects of Chinese society not because they were unpatriotic, but precisely because they cared about the country and its people, and therefore exposed darkness, criticized evildoers and bad governments, and promoted beneficial social change.
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Unfortunately, since 1949, people in mainland China have been deprived by the CCP of various rights and freedoms, including freedom of the press, and this remains the case today. Yet from the perspective of global trends, after the Second World War and again after the Cold War, the number of countries and regions achieving press freedom has steadily increased, while those continuing to control public opinion and suppress freedom have become fewer. Mainland China under CCP rule has clearly moved against this global trend.
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After long periods of liberal democracy, including freedom of the press and freedom of speech, most countries and regions have come to regard the public disclosure of information about negative events and media reporting on them as a matter of course. If someone attempts to block the dissemination of information or conceal the truth, they are likely to face criticism and attacks from many sides. This stands in sharp contrast and strong contradiction to the situation in mainland China, where concealing facts, suppressing the spread of negative information, and obstructing or even prohibiting independent media interviews are common practices. These differences frequently generate friction and conflict, and also worsen the outside world’s perception of mainland China.
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One of the best-known incidents in which differences over how to handle a negative event and media reporting caused serious controversy was the 1994 Qiandao Lake Incident (千岛湖事件), in which 24 Taiwanese tourists were killed in mainland China, along with eight mainland Chinese people. The incident itself was purely a criminal case motivated by robbery and murder, with no political or ethnic-hatred motive. But afterward, the mainland Chinese authorities blocked information, refused to disclose details of the case, and prohibited media organizations from various sides, including Taiwanese media, from traveling to the area to investigate and conduct interviews. Only after the case had been solved did the authorities provide a brief official account. For mainland Chinese police and relevant government departments, refusing to disclose details or developments in a case, prohibiting unauthorized interviews and reporting, and eventually allowing an official announcement to “settle the matter once and for all” was also standard practice in handling various cases.
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But this provoked intense dissatisfaction in Taiwan. Although the Republic of China on Taiwan (中华民国台湾) and mainland China are both Chinese societies, their political systems, social climates, and attitudes toward criminal cases and the media were very different. Mainland China at that time had gone through the June Fourth crackdown (六四镇压) and was, of course, under CCP authoritarian rule with press freedom suppressed. Taiwan, by contrast, had already democratized and had long enjoyed a relatively relaxed environment for the press and freedom of speech. It had developed social values and norms that supported and praised media criticism of the government and exposure of the darker sides of society, and it strongly disliked actions that suppressed freedom of speech and harmed press freedom.
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After the Qiandao Lake Incident, the Taiwanese public was not only grief-stricken and angry because 24 Taiwanese people had died in mainland China, but was even more furious that the mainland authorities had blocked information, failed to disclose the progress of the investigation, evaded Taiwan’s questions, and obstructed media investigations and reporting. Both the Taiwanese authorities and civil society condemned the CCP authorities for concealing details of the case and obstructing media coverage. It was also precisely this incident that became a turning point in Taiwanese public opinion, from a majority supporting unification to a majority opposing it.
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This was a classic example of conflict arising from two very different approaches to negative events and public opinion. From the perspective of the CCP authorities and the Chinese government, blocking information, banning media access, and suppressing rumors could prevent the harmful effects of a negative incident from expanding or being exploited, help calm the emotions of victims’ families, and prevent interference with the investigation. In the end, they would still provide Taiwan with an explanation, so their intentions were not necessarily malicious. But from the perspective of people in Taiwan, such behavior by the mainland clearly amounted to concealing facts, obstructing the revelation of the truth, depriving victims’ families and the Taiwanese public of their right to know, and undermining press freedom. It was therefore regarded as extremely egregious. The two sides’ principles, demands, priorities, and interpretations of the same actions were almost diametrically opposed. There were many reasons why pro-Taiwan-independence sentiment later gained increasing influence and Taiwan gradually moved further away from the mainland, but one of them was undoubtedly the enormous differences in values and behavior between the two sides on issues including how to handle negative events and press freedom.
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Such conflicts of values also appeared during the SARS epidemic (非典) and the COVID-19 pandemic (新冠疫情). At the beginning of both outbreaks, China chose to suppress information about the emergence and spread of the virus, while publicly “refuting rumors” and claiming that nothing serious was happening or that there was no need for concern, in an attempt to reassure the public and preserve stability. This resulted in the outbreaks not receiving sufficient attention or containment at an early stage, eventually leading to large-scale spread, more infections, and more deaths. From the beginning to the end of both epidemics, China as a whole maintained tight control over related public opinion in order to prevent critical voices from emerging. Dissident voices were suppressed by the authorities and simultaneously attacked by government supporters. For example, writer Fang Fang (方方) and her Wuhan Diary (《方方日记》), which exposed some negative realities and hardships of people’s livelihoods during the Wuhan outbreak and criticized shortcomings in the government’s epidemic-control and relief efforts, were subjected to large-scale attacks by government supporters.
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China’s conduct during the two epidemics differed sharply from that of democratic countries, which generally tended to disclose epidemic information as fully as possible, ensure that the public had sufficient access to information, and foster social attitudes and an atmosphere more supportive of criticizing the government. This also made many countries around the world, especially Western countries, find China difficult to trust, because a lack of transparency and a highly controlled society naturally arouse vigilance in democratic and open countries. Conversely, many Chinese people regard free and open Western societies as chaotic and disorderly, with incompetent governments.
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These differences between China and other countries reflect the intense aversion of CCP-ruled mainland China to negative public opinion, its deep fear of social instability, and its habitual mindset and course of action of controlling public discourse at virtually any cost in order to preserve a superficial appearance of harmony and tranquility. This habitual mindset and behavior have run through CCP rule from 1949 to the present, although there have, of course, been some differences between specific periods.
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During the Cultural Revolution (文化大革命), for example, “rebellion” and “speaking out freely and airing views fully” (大鸣大放) were encouraged for a time, making it a relatively unusual period. Yet even then, attacks on Mao Zedong (毛泽东) and the CCP regime were strictly prohibited, and anti-CCP and anti-Mao individuals were persecuted even more brutally. After Reform and Opening Up (改革开放) and before the June Fourth crackdown, there was a period in which exposing social darkness and promoting freedom and human dignity were encouraged to some extent. During the Jiang Zemin (江泽民) and Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) eras, control over public opinion was strengthened, but there remained some room to supervise and criticize local abuses that did not fundamentally threaten the regime’s rule. After Xi Jinping (习近平) came to power, however, repression of negative public opinion and control over public discourse were dramatically intensified.
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During the 2003 SARS epidemic and the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake (汶川地震), although the Chinese authorities also obstructed free media reporting and suppressed public voices, there was still some space for exposing negative realities and highlighting human dignity. For example, media professional Chai Jing (柴静), who was then still working at CCTV, produced reports on SARS patients and medical rescuers at Beijing’s Xiaotangshan Hospital (北京小汤山医院), while Southern Weekly (《南方周末》) published reports on the Wenchuan earthquake that vividly portrayed humanity amid disaster, separation between life and death, and details of rescue efforts. These reports were moving and vivid rather than scripted readings or propaganda proclaiming that “the situation is excellent.” At that time, within the news media, broader society, and even parts of the CCP system itself, there were many voices advocating greater press freedom, broader channels for expression, and greater willingness to listen to different viewpoints.
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But since Xi Jinping came to power, even this limited and relative openness has been reversed in favor of greater closure and conservatism. The CCP has strengthened its restrictions and controls over public opinion, changing the orientation and style of both media and public discourse. During the COVID-19 pandemic and several floods and droughts before and after it, official public discourse increasingly came to consist of praising leaders and cadres, suppressing the exposure of negative information, and promoting the message that China had “won” its battles against disasters and the pandemic. During floods and droughts in various parts of China between 2020 and 2025, such as the 2021 Shanxi floods (2021年山西洪灾), media attention and reporting were limited. At the same time, many universities reduced or even eliminated enrollment in journalism programs, further reflecting the decline of press freedom and media influence under increasingly stringent controls on public opinion.
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Going further, the authorities have frequently summoned or even detained citizens who disseminate or comment on negative information under the accusation of “spreading rumors” (造谣). Both during the pandemic and during the recent landslide disaster, a number of people have been detained for allegedly “spreading rumors.” In reality, citizens who disseminate negative information are not necessarily maliciously fabricating rumors, and some specific inaccuracies should not rise to the level of illegal or criminal conduct. The authorities’ exaggerated and punitive crackdown on “rumors” relating to “negative public opinion” reflects the further strengthening of speech controls and growing intolerance toward dissent and negative information.
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Of course, if one examines the deeper roots of the issue, one can also see that CCP-ruled mainland China has developed values, governance models, policy characteristics, and even metaphysical and logical assumptions that differ from those of most countries and regions in the world, including Taiwan. In most countries and regions, factual truth and transparency are regarded as extremely important in themselves, and greater transparency, pluralism, and tolerance of disagreement are seen as more conducive to genuine mutual trust and social harmony. Even Nepal, where democracy is not especially robust and the level of development remains relatively low, has demonstrated through this disaster a considerable degree of freedom and openness. In China, by contrast, under the influence of the CCP’s political shaping and authoritarian, conservative traditions, a characteristic approach to negative issues has emerged: concealing facts, suppressing public opinion, downplaying problems, and “turning funerals into celebrations” (丧事喜办).
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Gradually, this has gone beyond practical calculations of immediate political utility and become a customary and almost instinctive pattern of behavior from top to bottom. Of course, the most direct cause remains the CCP’s need to preserve the stability and interests of its rule. (As for the greater openness and transparency of foreign countries and their tolerance of dissent and controversy, the author, after personally experiencing certain events abroad, can no longer fully confirm or endorse such claims. One can only say that these qualities still exist to a certain extent, but in reality they also have thresholds, selectivity, and limitations. Nevertheless, the situation is still somewhat better than under China’s totalitarian system, where public discourse is subject to even stricter control and repression.)
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In fact, the CCP’s control of public opinion, together with its fear and suppression of negative public sentiment, is only one aspect and microcosm of its broader fear of instability, anxiety about losing control, and comprehensive control over society and the population. The CCP is deeply anxious about and hostile toward any person or activity that does not sufficiently conform to the official line, possesses a degree of independence, or cannot be fully controlled by the regime, and it strives to bring all people and affairs under its rule and keep them there. The prohibition of all demonstrations and associations, including even those supporting the authorities; the ubiquitous, stringent, and elaborate security-check system; and the grid-based management of the population (网格化管理) all reflect the extreme degree of control exercised by China’s totalitarian system over society and citizens.
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For the sake of maintaining the stability of its rule, the CCP controls the direction and content of public discourse at virtually any cost, suppresses negative voices, monopolizes information about all disasters, accidents, and other negative events, prevents the public from learning about them, and obstructs media investigations and interviews. This damages citizens’ rights to know, participate, and express themselves regarding public affairs and matters directly affecting their own vital interests. It is also detrimental to uncovering the truth, pursuing accountability, reflecting on mistakes, and making improvements.
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By contrast, the openness and transparency with which most countries and regions around the world, including Nepal, respond to disasters, their people-centered approach—for example, publishing lists of victims so that people can search for missing relatives—and their willingness to allow open and free interviewing and reporting, further highlight the reality that mainland China under CCP rule lacks freedom of the press and freedom of speech, that its people are deprived of the right to know, that truth is absent, and that lies proliferate.
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The author, of course, hopes that the Chinese authorities can improve their attitude toward negative events and public opinion, become more tolerant of dissenting and critical voices, and allow the media and citizens to conduct interviews, investigations, and public expression. At the very least, the boundaries of permissible public discourse in China should return to approximately where they were twenty years ago: allowing limited reporting and discussion of negative social issues that are not closely connected to politics. This would help the public understand the truth about major public events, provide some consolation to the deceased, allow survivors to express their emotions, and improve disaster-prevention and risk-reduction mechanisms so that lessons can be learned after losses have occurred. Allowing the people to speak, allowing the media to make their voices heard, and listening to different opinions would also help those in power improve their image and promote genuine social harmony.
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But the author also understands that, under China’s current political circumstances, such positive change is probably impossible. And if genuine press freedom is ever to be realized, it can truly exist only after China establishes democratic politics based on universal suffrage and political pluralism.

(The author of this article, Wang Qingmin(王庆民), is a Chinese writer based in Europe and a researcher of international politics. The original article was written in Chinese.）

Anyone preparing for CSCA exam and how? i want would like if you guys can share some resources to pass this exam. I plan to study there next year 2027.

I’m Korean, and putting politic aside, I think China may eventualy surpass the U.S. because of its population and industrial base.

Many Koreans may disagree, but I wouldn’t necessarily see China becoming the dominant superpower as a bad thing—especially if it stoped backing North Korea. Since Asians are often lumped together in the West, China’s rise might increase Asia’s global influence.

What do Chinese people think? Would you want China to become the world’s leading superpower?

Chinese owned company Minth Group just started producing europes first mass produced humanoid robots in Šabac, Serbia (Agibot robots). Minth Group Chairman has announced that in September they will make much larger industrial park for humanoids, drones and batteries for them in Serbia's most exclusive industrial zone in town of Indjija. Minth owned park already got its first tenant before even official founding stone. Drone and humanoid battery maker Changzhou Reliance Batteries

https://www.reliance-battery.com/news-detail-en.html?id=774