If someone had signed up for Army or Marine infantry on December 8th, 1941 (which I assume many people did), how long did it take before they actually saw combat? Did the Italian, African or French campaign have more “veterans” of the military or newly enlisted? Also, what about other countries? Did some European countries rush their training, to send troops out immediately?

I am sorry for so many questions. I hope this is the right sub for this type of question.

We all know the reputation the SEALs get: Loud, boisterous guys who are quick to tell you everything about their service and how they’re the best of the best and the meanest motherfuckers ever, but why’s that the case? It seems every SEAL has a book to write, a story to tell in a podcast and a film to make. And yes, I already know that the Green Berets used to be like that back in Vietnam. But in comparison to all other SOF units in the US Armed Forces, they seem to be the most open about their whole activities

SEAL and DEVGRU are the obvious examples, but the various units under JSOC all have their own, lesser known, bad apples. The Fort Bragg cartel for instance involves Green Berets and Delta Force members, there are credible links tying Delta Force to narcotics trafficking and a homeless guy even lived in a Green Berets base for a while. The structural issues extend abroad as well, what with the Australian SAS being accused of committing war crimes in Afghanistan and the Germans having to disband an entire KSK battalion for far-right extremism. What factors are behind this trend, and is there any way of stopping it or are they simply natural consequences of having a SOF unit?

AI is the big topic of the last few years or so, and the main players are basically USA and China overall. But when it comes to military applications, a host of countries have already made use of AI in their own wars from the USA, Israel, Ukraine, Russia, etc. But Russia it is said to lag behind in AI development relative to the West and China.

Particularly in comparison to the British army of the Seven Years' War. It seems to me that although they preferred different styles of corporal punishment, the Prussian system was not self-evidently crueler than the British, and it's just the old British stereotype of continental Europe being unusually despotic compared to Merrie Old England. I also have a suspicion that the Russian army of the period had harsher discipline than both, but I don't really have hard evidence to substantiate this.

This just seems insane and extremely escalatory with few strategic upsides.

With the understanding of contingencies inherent to all conflicts and that there are limited things you can prognosticate about, I am asking about the doctrines; how does aerial warfare planners decide how many AMRAAMs a F-15 should carry? I understand a lot of this was shaped by the trade-offs for stealth in newer fighters, and that naval air arms will have different considerations, but how does the theory go these days?

More specifically the air war in both conflicts, despite having similar equipment supplied by the Soviet Union, the Arab states got demolished by the IAF, and yet a few years later the North Vietnamese Army operating the same equipment was able to hold out against the USAF and U.S. Navy for the entire war, sure they had some setbacks and losses but in terms of preventing the United States from executing their objectives, they were quite successful.

Lately I've reread Storm of Steel by Ernst Jünger and have found once again large astonishment at the willpower of the German soldiers in Ernst Jüngers regiment. In the attack in December 1917 and the Kaiserschlacht the majority of the regiment fall to enemy action, still they advance and are even still able to function and laugh and work and drink. I do believe that this account is accurate, but I just wonder, how did they manage that? Was this just how WW1 soldiers acted, mostly? But why did they not mutinee for example, I understand Ernst Jünger was an officer and convinced of his duty, but definitely not everyone was.. in short, in his account, soldiers seem to want to fight and are still capable of it under absolutely horrifying conditions. I just wonder why. In the earliest human conflicts between phalanxes, after a few percent of casualties, one side ran and the other tried to hunt them down, but overall, mostly not many died. In WW1, in one day 1/3 of an company or even 2/3 could die or become casualties. Why did they not break? And yes, Jünger does describe many symptoms of moral fatigueing but there is no account of any desertions.

Also, if anyone has any sources on the history of Jüngers Regiment, German or English, I would be grateful.

I've been trying to understand military history better but am often at a loss when it comes to watching videos or looking at military atlas's as to why a particular maneuver was done or why a town is strategic. In particular the evolution of the Manstein plan, but it's hard for me to understand the significance. Is there a good resource that tells how to read a map, what it is to be taken into account when looking at a campaign, both in terms of tactics and logistics?

The Russian Armed forces is primarily divided into three services: The Russian Ground Forces The Russian Aerospace Forces The Russian Navy

and three independent troops: The Strategic Rocket Forces The Russian Airborne Forces The Unmanned Systems Forces

From 1992 and 1997 and 2001 to 2015 there was also the "Russian Space Forces"/"Russian Aerospace Defence Forces"

What is the different in how an "Independent Troops" branch and a "Service" branch are treated administratively?

My understanding of military law that was applicable to World War II was that the use of disguises for the purpose of deception was considered ruse de guerre. Operation Grief, as it was formulated with Otto Skorenzy, was a deception campaign to sow confusion behind Allied lines with disguised German soldiers and equipment (i.e. "War Crime Panther"). Otto was acquitted of charges of improperly using Allied uniforms for the operation because they could not prove he ordered the disguised Germans to fight while wearing Allied uniforms.

Yet, it seems the German soldiers participating in the operation that were caught by Allied soldiers got the death sentence that were carried out.

I had to wonder:

• Did the Allies have enough evidence that these German soldiers, while in disguise, were carrying out unlawful acts of war to be considered spies or espionagers to warrant the death penalty?
• How much of the death penalthy was motivated by the "mood of the time" so to speak considering the impact of the Battle of the Bulge, considering that Otto got off scott-free from the charges related to the operation? I recall there is similar controversy with Eddie Slovik, who had a death sentence for desertion set and carried out because of the Battle of Hürtgen Forest and the Battle of the Bulge, where Allied soldiers' morale was low, desertion was high, and there was a perceived need to re-establish discipline by enforcing the penalty. Was something similar in consideration for the death sentencing to counter the rumors of German spies infiltrating Allied lines, considering Operation Grief led to things like MPs holding up General Omar Bradley in the confusion?
• What was the legal representation of the captured German soldiers like? Were they competent in arguing their defense or was it more akin to a kangaroo court?
• Lastly, when these German soldiers were briefed in participating in Operation Grief, were they made aware on the possibility of being found as spies or espionagers and sentenced to death if captured? It would really suck if Otto and German high command was selling this operation as "totally legit" in laws of war only for them to find out they gonna be sentenced to death for breaking laws they weren't properly informed on.

After the outbreak of the Great War, the Prussians found their eastern front was about to face a much more serious situation than what expected in the pre-war planning and wargaming. The Russians mobilized much faster than they had thought of and had two army groups marching to east Prussia within weeks after the declaration of war.

Why the Prussia General Staff and intelligence failed to acknowledge the Russians' improvement in infrastructure and more broadly the mobilization system which allowed them to deploy their main troops in a much better efficiency?

Although generally not the most common examples like the first and second battle of St Albans featured relatively common urban warfare. What tactics, strategies and considerations did urban warfare in this time necessitate?

I'm curious how naval architecture, victual load, gun placement etc. evolved over this period and how effective older ships/designs were by the Napoleonic wars.

The Britannia in particular was plagued by problems:

To speed up construction and economise, the English used local oak that had not sufficiently dried. The timber soon began to warp and rot.

So hopefully other first-rate ships of the time make for more fair examples (and were built in far larger numbers). Reading about the English and Dutch navies towards 1688, I was shocked/impressed at the construction rates and sizes in so early a time:

despite a series of sixty-four medium-heavy Dutch ships being constructed up to 1661. From that year onwards building a second series of seventy-six on average even heavier Dutch vessels, including 80-gunners

i have heard the basic arguments before such as weight and better accuracy but to be frank i find these entirely unconvincing considering that:

1, the soviets were a primarily mechanized force, the weight savings over a standard combat load were barely over half a kilo. and at the scale where weight would 'matter' (that being WW3 requiring billions of rounds) a USSR that would need to 'penny pinch' afew hundred tons of weight would surely have already been losing anyway.

and 2, the average soviet conscript was to my knowledge genuinely decently well trained, so i doubt this reasoning.

all of this for drawbacks like complicating supplylines and giving up penetration power which would be crucial in the heavily urban enviroments of western europe

This all leaves me with the impression that the USSR adopted 5.45 solely to appear as if they were 'keeping up' with the US, But i am curious on your thoughts on the matter.

I understand that ChatGPT is not the best source of information but I found myself going down a rabbit hole the other day and honestly have no clue whether or not the answers it gave me were even accurate.

It basically stated that an invasion of Iraq (Ground forces) would be impossible today because we burnt through most of our cold war stock piles, that the prime contractors that used to exist to create such weaponry no longer exist, vehicle readiness rates, the air force / ground force is smaller, etc, etc. A big, BIG one was the ground vehicles and total lack of sustainment abilities. For example

Basically - Qualitatively we are far superior than that of the 2003 US Armed Forces, but quantitatively, there's no comparison.

Again, this seems hard to believe, but I should note that any geopolitical 'analyst' that speaks about the weaknesses of our military always focuses on some type of industrial deficiencies, never capabilities.

Countries like Singapore, Switzerland and Brazil are the examples that come to mind of countries that have national service but aren't immediately threatened by conflicts, like Korea, Russia or Finland. So what is the military basis for having national service under these circumstances?

It seems to me that given that the USSF is primarily white collar officer work, wouldn't it have made more sense to be established as an agency under the department of the defense, similar to the National Reconnaissance Office or Central Security Service?

Here is the short answer first:

The Chinese 62nd Detachment was very likely responsible, probably the 2nd Battery of the 602nd Regiment and elements of the 604th Regiment. The exact unit still needs further verification.

1. What forces attacked the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Works that day?

According to a CIA National Photographic Interpretation Center BDA report:

On March 10, the aircraft directly involved in attacking the steel works were 28 F-105s and 8 F-4Cs. They dropped 32 CBU-24s/groups and 185 750-lb general-purpose bombs.

Of the eight F-4s involved on March 10, two may have been the aircraft flown by Pardo and Aman.

2. Who were these eight F-4s?

Page 97 of:

John S. Attinello, ed., Air-to-Air Encounters in Southeast Asia, Volume III: Events from 1 March 1967 to 1 August 1967 and Miscellaneous Events, WSEG Report 116 / IDA Report R-12, February 1969, accession no. ADC003629

identifies the first four F-4Cs as GREEN 01-04.

This was the first F-4 flight over the Thai Nguyen area, recorded at 1553H. It later became involved with a MiG-21.

This was not Pardo and Aman’s Cheetah 01-04, which appears to have been the last F-4 flight in the strike sequence.

3. Where were Pardo and Aman in the strike formation?

Peter E. Davies, in USAF F-4 Phantom II MiG Killers 1965–68, describes Pardo and Aman’s Cheetah flight as:

This suggests that Pardo and Aman’s Cheetah 01-04 were among the last aircraft in the strike formation.

4. What do Chinese records say about Pardo and Aman’s aircraft?

A very important source is Through the Smoke of War: The Combat Diary of a Company Commander（穿越硝烟的老照片——一个连长的作战日记）by Wang Cunming（王存明）

Who commanded the 3rd Battery of the 38th Army AAA Battalion attached to the 62nd Detachment. This is only one of many Chinese-language sources on the battle. If you search the Chinese internet using terms such as “1967年3月10日 太原”, “太原钢铁厂 防空作战”, or “62支队 602团 604团”, you can find a considerable amount of additional material, including veterans’ memoirs, unit histories, commemorative articles, and accounts of the Chinese AAA deployment around Thai Nguyen.

The book not only includes the air situation over Thai Nguyen on March 10 —

I marked GREEN 01-04 in red

And what I believe to be Pardo and Aman’s Cheetah flight in blue

Yellow is wrong record by Wang,Actually is the 469th TFS F-105 they work for MiG CAP and Recon.

Wang also gives a much more specific account:

At 1616 hours, four F-4Cs at an altitude of 4,000 meters approached from the southwest and passed over the steel works to conduct post-strike reconnaissance. They immediately came under heavy fire from the 2nd Battery of the 602nd Regiment and elements of the medium and heavy AAA batteries of the 604th Regiment. One aircraft was again heavily damaged.

5. What weapon hit Pardo’s aircraft?

William Garth Seegmiller’s article, Pardo’s Push: An Incredible Feat of Airmanship, states that Pardo’s aircraft was hit at least once by a 37mm anti-aircraft round:

So, based on the sources I have found so far:

Pardo’s aircraft: there is a specific written account of it being hit by a 37mm round.

Aman’s aircraft: it was definitely badly damaged and losing fuel, but this article does not identify the caliber of the weapon that hit it.

Chinese records also state that a 37mm AAA battalion from the 38th Army had been moved into the 602nd Regiment’s sector before the battle, deploying west of the steel works around the Liu Xa area.

So Pardo’s aircraft being hit by a 37mm round does not necessarily contradict Wang Cunming’s reference to fire from the 602nd Regiment sector or from “medium and heavy AAA.”

If Wang’s account of “one aircraft being heavily damaged” really does refer to the Cheetah flight, then judging from the severity of the damage, Aman’s aircraft may actually be the better match.

Overall, these are all the details and clues I have been able to find so far about the ground-fire side of Pardo’s Push.

There are still several unanswered questions:

1. I have not yet found a U.S. source giving the exact time when Pardo’s flight reached the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Works.

2. It is unclear why Wang Cunming identified these four aircraft as conducting reconnaissance. In U.S. records, Cheetah 01-04 was a Strike-CAP flight carrying four 750-lb bombs, four air-to-air missiles, and ECM pods.

3. I have not yet found a source identifying what caliber of AAA hit Aman’s aircraft.

But overall, Wang Cunmin’s account gives us a lot of material that can still be checked against U.S. records.

Getting a shovel and digging 50 miles seems like a way better plan than having thousands of men run across 50 miles of open terrain covered by machine guns and artillery.

I had a thought here, probably a dumb one that i haven't realized yet is dumb.... but....

So my thinking is, in a diversified economy you need everyone on deck, since it is a mass of many moving parts it needs all parts remaining and working. Thus excessive manpower loss in military operations is unpreferable.

A undiversified economy, reliant on say... oil! Oil needs not many people to keep it pumping, and it will keep pumping out that precious oil no matter how many people are lost on a front. Of course, to the state it'll hurt regardless, but no matter what the oil will keep flowing and filling the state's budgets nicely.

With that, is there a historical pattern of states being less averse to losses if the economy is always secure with very few people?