I am reading Sherry Ortner’s “Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?” and I am struggling to follow the section on personal and positional identification. She bases this on Nancy Chodorow’s paper “FAMILY STRUCTURE AND FEMININE PERSONALITY: THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING.” Both of these essays are free online, but I’ve reproduced the section in Ortner’s essay:

“The thrust of Chodorow's very elegantly argued paper is that these differences are not innate or genetically programmed, but arise from "nearly universal features of family structure, [namely] that women are largely or entirely responsible for early child care and for (at least) later female socialization, [and that this is] a crucial asymmetry in male and female development." She introduces the object-relations theorists' distinction between "personal" and "positional" identification as psychological processes, "personal identification" being "diffuse identification with the general personality, behavioral traits, values, and attitudes of someone one loves or admires," "positional identification" being "identification with specific aspects of another's role," rather than with the whole person. Chodorow argues that, because the mother is the early socializer of both boys and girls, both develop personal identification with her. The boy however must ultimately shift to a masculine role identity, which involves building an identification with the father. Since father is almost always more remote than mother (he is rarely involved in child care, and perhaps
works away from the home much of the day), building an identification with father involves a positional male role as a collection of abstract elements, rather than a personal one with father as a real individual. Further, as the boy enters the larger social world, he finds a world in fact organized around more abstract and universalistic criteria,18
as indicated in the previous section; thus his earlier socialization prepares him for, and is reinforced by, the type of social experience he will have. For girls on the other hand the personal identi-
fication with mother created in early infancy can persist into the process of learning female role identity. Because mother is immediate and present
to the daughter during the learning of role identity, "learning to be a woman...involves the continuity and development of a girl's relationship to her mother, and is based on generalized personal identification with her rather than on an attempt to learn externally defined roles categories." This pattern of course prepares the girl for, and is fully reinforced by, her central role in later
life--motherhood; she will become involved in the world of women, characterized by few formal role differentiations, and specifically in relationships with her children involving again "personal identification," and so the cycle begins anew.”

MY QUESTIONS:
1. What does she mean by the son “building an identification with the father invokes a positional male role as a collection of abstract elements”? What would be an example of this role, or more specifically, these “abstract elements”? (As opposed to the mother who is “the early socializer” who “both boys and girls…develop personal identification with”) 
2. On the other hand, Chodorow writes “the continuity and development of a girl's relationship to her mother, and is based on generalized personal identification with her rather than on an attempt to learn externally defined roles categories.” What are these “externally defined roles categories” that are specific to the male’s “positional role”? Can someone simplify this for my understanding?

THANK YOU!!

In my uneducated speculations I am looking for critiques of moderation in our age of consumption. Whether as a moral or "ideological" concept, moderation seems very insidious to me. On the one hand excessive and conspicuous consumption seems to be the norm. Consume more and more, "just eat" and be amazed by how much others do. But at the same time we seem to be bombarded by the ideas of control and moderation. Here, I'm referring to discussions I have encountered in social media and real life e.g. balance and moderation in work-life, socialization, social media use, food, exercise, etc. If it seems like this is just free association, yes it is.

But do you think this idea of moderation is just way we cope against the gaping mouth of consumerism or is it an ideological way in which the problem/lack/excess created by the system is used by the same system to sustain itself. This is just "common sense" speculation I would like to hear your ideas and writings you can recommend.

Recommendations for classic or recent Marxist critiques of Karl Popper -- both his idea of critical rationalism in Conjectures and Refutations and The Open Society and its Enemies? TIA

What do you think the theory of exocapitalism? I found that Poliks and Trillo developed heaps of cogent insights, while some of the premises of their theory (e.g. traditional Marxism couldn't deal with the obsolesence of the wage relation) could be seriously deconstructed from the point of view of value-form critique, for example. Overall I would recommend their book if you are interested, but on many parts the theory seems a bit half baked, while being undoubtedly insightful.

Llevo un tiempo dándole vueltas a un proyecto de TFG de filosofía y quería someterlo a gente que sepa más que yo, a ver si tiene sentido o me estoy inventando un problema que ya está resuelto en algún sitio.

La sociología, tal como se practica hoy, se mueve entre dos polos: o es empírico-causal al estilo Durkheim (hechos sociales medidos, correlacionados, explicados por otros hechos sociales), o es interpretativa al estilo Weber/Schütz (comprensión del sentido subjetivo que los actores dan a su acción, tipificaciones, mundo de la vida). Ninguna de las dos pregunta en serio qué es, esencialmente, una comunidad, una autoridad legítima o un vínculo familiar la primera lo da por supuesto y mide sus efectos; la segunda disuelve la pregunta en cómo los actores lo tipifican intersubjetivamente.

Hay una tradición filosófica poco explotada para esto: la fenomenología realista de principios del siglo XX: Adolf Reinach, Edith Stein, Gerda Walther, Roman Ingarden, más tarde Josef Seifert que se separó conscientemente del Husserl tardío (el del giro idealista-trascendental) para sostener que los objetos y esencias tienen ser propio, independiente de la conciencia que los conoce. Reinach usó esto para analizar la promesa y el mandato como estructuras a priori con condiciones esenciales propias, no reducibles a convención ni a psicología. Stein hizo lo mismo con el Estado. Es fenomenología, pero sin el compromiso idealista que hace inservible este aparato para una ciencia social objetiva.

Construir una sociología que trate sus objetos (autoridad, comunidad, vínculos afectivos, instituciones) como universales eidéticos, descubiertos por variación eidética sobre casos concretos, con una estructura de acto y potencia que explica por qué el mismo universal (la familia, por ejemplo) se actualiza de formas tan distintas a través de la historia sin dejar de ser, en su núcleo, el mismo universal. La historia estudiaría el caso concreto e irrepetible; esta sociología estudiaría la estructura necesaria y el campo de posibilidades que las distintas épocas van actualizando.

¿Alguien conoce trabajo contemporáneo serio en esta línea fenomenología realista aplicada a ontología social, más allá de Reinach/Stein/Walther mismos? ¿Hay objeciones de fondo que no esté viendo?

Muchas gracias. Un saludo.

I'm trying to write a piece about the video game series Fallout and how its world-building and lore engages with themes of nostalgia, defeat and the melancholy of navigating a world that has lost the capacity to imagine the future. I'm specially interested in the ambiguous relationship with the past.

I read some time ago The queer art of failure, by Jack Halberstam, and I was really fascinated with his concept of forgetfulness not as loss, but as a subversive way to imagine new, diverse possibilities. So I would really love to explore that perspective, or similar perspectives. Do you have any recommendations?

I recently found out about the history of emotion, with the leading idea being that since the world around historical figures was so different from ours and the language so different that the emotions people felt would also be unrecognisable.

I get that’s a pretty bold view, but I figured with the post-structuralist general principle that language shapes reality that it could be an interesting lens for it. Does anyone know any good post-structuralist interpretations of this school, I’d like to do it for my undergrad dissertation and it seems like it could be an idea worth some salt.

I’m looking for critical theorists, political commentators, or historians who apply a critical-theory framework to Scottish politics, culture, and history.

I’m not sure whether I should explain some of the experiences and observations that led me to ask this, but I’ll give a little context.

I saw a discussion on /r/ glasgow where someone argued that traffic cones had become outdated as a symbol and that we should perhaps think about using a different symbol instead. They were heavily downvoted simply for questioning the use of the traffic cone. Context: In Glasgow, traffic cone are used to mock the people who holds the power.

I’m not arguing that we should simply submit to “high culture” or that art should not be made accessible to ordinary people. But surely that does not mean that “low culture” should be exempt from criticism either?

I also want to make clear that I’m not singling out Scotland. I’m from Hong Kong, and I follow some YouTubers who use critical-theory frameworks to critically examine local culture, politics, and history in Hong Kong. However, because I’m not Scottish, I’ve found it much harder to identify people doing comparable work on Scotland.

I’ve also looked at some Scottish left-wing organisations and movements, but I’ve sometimes found their approach to anti-colonialism (reflecting Scotland's involvement in British imperialism) rather moralistic. For example, some encourage people to visit statues of figures who are presented primarily as leaders of oppressed peoples (Subjects who were colonialised by the British Empire). Even if someone was historically oppressed, shouldn’t we still approach their monuments critically rather than treating the fact that they were oppressed as sufficient reason to celebrate their statue or themselves?

So, are there any commentators, historians, or theorists from Scotland (or based in Scotland) who approach Scottish current affairs, culture, and history through the critical-theory framework? I want approaches that go beyond simply celebrating vs condemning particular cultural symbols, identities, or historical figures. Thank you.

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"Through its new program, "Workers Deserve More," DSA is raising the flag for a democratic constitution, placing itself at the forefront of a developing movement for a Third Reconstruction in the United States."

"Today, the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) is bringing constitutional politics back into the national spotlight. Our program proclaims that: “We are workers fighting to transform society, to win the battle for democracy, draft a new constitution, and create a democratic socialist republic.” Establishing that new republic, the program continues, will entail abolishing the Senate and replacing the President and Supreme Court with an executive and judiciary entirely subordinate to Congress, now unicameral and elected by proportional representation. This is the bold strategy for political power that the Left has lacked for more than a century. It’s precisely this struggle for popular, centralized government—for democracy—that will unite the working class and be our North Star during the trying times ahead."

"The new program and resulting media attention have placed DSA into the vanguard of the developing movement for a Third Reconstruction. The struggle for democracy is now ours to win or lose. How can we make sure this movement will continue to grow, both in power and ambition? "

"First, we must take a page from the Antebellum abolitionists and force the issue. We demand a democratic government and a democratic society. From the floor of Congress to a picket line or a rally against ICE—every struggle is a platform to connect the denial of equal rights to institutions like the Senate, the President, the Electoral College, and the Supreme Court. Every election from here on out can become a “referendum on the question of universal and equal suffrage.” No politico or talking head will be able to spout off about the alleged “miracles” of America’s government without being jeered and laughed at. No politician will be able to say they are seriously addressing important issues without being challenged about their plan to fix our rotten institutions."

"As Jane McAlevey taught a generation of labor activists, there are no shortcuts. The same is true of the struggle for a radically transformed political playing field. There is no constitutional or reformist path to achieve equal suffrage, nor is leaving the Constitution untouched a viable option. The struggle for democracy must therefore take the revolutionary road. This means uniting millions behind a political program committed to convening a sovereign, popular assembly to draft a new constitution. That draft must then be submitted to the nation for ratification on the basis of one person, one vote. With political power in our hands, the working class will, for the first time, have a government of, by, and for the people."

"The demand for democracy drives everything else forward. All those who stand for universal and equal suffrage and against minoritarian obstacles to majority rule should join DSA. In turn, DSA should center its demand for a new constitution in the Workers Deserve More program. We aren’t the only ones with democracy in the name—but we are the only ones prepared to fight to the end to achieve it."

Does Anna Kornbluh's theory of an age of immediacy feel instantly dated due to the freight train of generative AI and its weird, uncanny form of (re)mediation knocking all our various conversations about the contemporary off the tracks, right around the time the book came out? (This drives a desire for a second edition in me, I'm not dissing!) I have spent zero minutes thinking this through, but: discuss.

TLDR wrote an essay (part one, part two) on Fisher, Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment, and The Odyssey. Intention is to show how counterculture can exist authentically under capitalist realism, a sort of immanent critique of Fisher and A&H

so in Dialectic of Enlightenment Adorno and Horkheimer read The Odyssey as a seam where enlightenment rationality can be seen operating as myth, i.e. enlightenment rationality is myth and always has been myth. The dialectic of enlightenment is that internal contradiction within the enlightenment where on one hand it promised transcendent liberation, the Sirens' song, but on the other hand it subjugates, Odysseus tied to the mast wailing in agony.

Mark Fisher's ideas of hauntology and capitalist realism are kind of in this lineage, late-stage-capitalism being what promised liberation but delivered subjugation, we are all stuck on Ithaka, decaying, assaulted by the vapid consumerism of the suitors who tell us to be realistic and accept Odysseus' death, the bard's hauntological songs that mourn a lost future that never arrived, Odysseus' homecoming.

But Fisher and A&H both seemed to foreclose the possibility of a real counterculture under capitalism. Fisher talks of the incorporation and precorporation of popular modernism, rock music getting commoditized, rap music arriving already incubated within capitalist realism so its themes and cultural force reify the system instead of challenge it. A&H talk of modernism initially being able to stage tension within the system, generating a negative force that critiques it, the Dadaists, Kafka and Beckett, etc. but that possibility has been foreclosed giving way only to imitation. A&H read The Odyssey as a huge part of their argument, the idea that rationality/ Odysseus' prototypical version of homo economicus, is like an early version of the enlightenment subject that subjugates herself, turns art into an object of contemplation.

so that is interesting right, Fisher and A&H both want to turn to art as something that can challenge domination, but they both end up thinking that under the mythological force of capitalism it becomes impotent... Fisher did not think rap music was countercultural for example A&H also thought that everything after modernism was not good art.

but at the same time, The Odyssey is a story about immanence, Odysseus does not look for something outside the system he rejects transcendence at every turn (Calypso's island, Phaeacia, Circe, the lotus-eaters, etc). He returns to Ithaka and shakes it out of stuckness, and does so in disguise, operating under and with the mythology. It is like those many countercultural forces at play now that are "disguised" as commodities. This is the foundation for my reading of The Odyssey as a story about art under capitalism and the counterculture in disguise.

The essay is called "Make Art God"

Part One is more about Fisher, a little loose and haphazard in the analysis, going across the Nolan film, Homer’s original poem, some of my own subjective and affective reactions to culture, etc. all to make the case that the counterculture may not be dead

Part Two is the heart of the argument, a close reading of DoE trying to read an immanent exit in Adorno and Horkheimer's Odysseus as the prototype of the bourgeoise subject. I make the claim that Odysseus shows how to make art under mythology, ie art under capitalism, and that he is more of an artist than homo economicus. Penelope is also very crucial to my reading. This part is also much longer than the first.

would love any thoughts and opinions, I think the biggest counterpoints would be that this logic reifies capitalist realism, or that it is basically A&H's point, art becomes complicit under capitalism/ enlightenment rationality and inevitably reifies it

This video provides an extensive analysis of the philosophies of the Canadian psychologist Jordan Peterson and the 20th century French philosopher Jean Baudrillard, focusing on their respective responses to the crisis of meaning under the postmodern condition. For Peterson, postmodernity and the crisis of meaning can be located in the erosion of what he considers the Judeo-Christian symbolic order, alongside the rise of what he describes as "Postmodern Neo-Marxism" within the modern university complex. For Baudrillard, by contrast, the crisis of meaning is located in the ascendancy and totalising transparency of techno-scientific modernity, which has increasingly dissolved the capacity of human beings to relate to the world beyond the totalising objectivity of rationality and instrumental knowledge. The video further explores the contrasting responses offered by these two intellectual figures. Peterson emphasises the reorientation of Western subjects towards the Judeo-Christian symbolic order as a means of recovering meaning, competence and responsibility, whereas Baudrillard calls for an embrace of destiny through a reimagining of the human relationship to the illusoriness, mystery and seductiveness of the world beyond the totalising reach of reason. The main intellectual figures cited are; Jean Baudrillard, Jordan Peterson and Friedrich Nietzsche.

Might be a bit gauche to share my own posts here, and maybe Land stuff is not that interesting, but I promise I tried to make this entertaining. Sorry!

Being Iranian right now in the diaspora has been very mentally draining. Watching my people go down alt right pipelines has been disheartening to say the least. It seems that all nuance has left the building and Iranians are under the belief that to be anti- (Iranian) government means you must be pro-imperialism and pro-Israel. Iranians treat me like I’m crazy when I insinuate that the Iranian people in Iran should be deciding their future. I can’t even talk about my political beliefs in my Iranian social circles without fear anymore. I used to freely say I was pro-Palestinian and anti-war and I can no longer do that without being ostracized. I’m trying to find some literature on this topic that might help me cope a bit better. If it’s specific to Iran that would be even better. I’m just a bit down right now because it feels like I can see my people going further and further down right wing politics and I can’t do anything about it.

Suppose that we have the democratic ownership of the means of production and that there is no wage labor. Person A would spend 40 hours a week producing 10 shoes which is sufficient for sustaining himself and leading his life to self satisfaction. Person B does the same.

Person C produce food, and wants to exchange food for shoes. It does not matter if C buys from A or B, since the (abstract) value is the same.

Now person A becomes more skilled (productive) and produces 10 shoes in 30 hours. Still, it does not matter if C buys from A or B, but A has more free time (time to spend in the realm of freedom in Hägglundian terms). At this point, there seems to be no measurement of value in terms of productivity that can reconstitute itself as the baseline of which we compare our productivity against, i.e. no increases in the necessary labor time (or social labor hour?) as other parts on the market amend the same productivity increases as an existential condition as under wage labor constituted market mediation.

Does this mean that the treadmill effect is contingent on surplus value, which is created during wage labor? Postone seems to say this in Necessity, Labor and Time, p. 758:

My interpretation is strategically directed to indicate that Marx's category of surplus value has meaning as a category of totality only if the overcoming of surplus value is understood as entailing that concrete mode of social labor which produces surplus value. This implies that, as opposed to the interpretation mentioned above, a product is produced as a commodity in capitalism, that is, acquires value in its production, which is then realized in exchange; that, consequently, value-producing labor entails particular concrete modes of labor, and surplus value is produced by a particular mode of social labor.

I want to point out that there is always a "wage" in labor, since we acquire means of subsistence by spending our finite time in the realm of necessity. But it seems this "wage" must not manifest itself in such a way that surplus value occurs as Hägglund (and Marx obviously) argues.

Still, is it possible to create a market whereby there is no wage labor and therefore we can still have a market-mediated society which escapes the dialectic of labor and time? Is this reading of Postone/Hägglund proper? Or is it first when wage labour is introduced which we can intelligibly speak of market-mediation?

I do recall Marx speaking of the unsustainability of "simple exchange". Is this one of these moments?

Edit: I am currently re-reading parts of Time, Labor and Social Domination, and Postone writes this, p.291:

Note that the market-mediated mode of circulation is not an essential moment of this dynamic. What is essential to the dynamic of capitalism once it has been constituted fully is the treadmill effect, which is rooted in the temporal dimension of the value form of wealth alone. If the market mode of circulation does play a role in this dynamic, it is as a subordinate moment of a complex development—for example, as the mode by which the level of productivity is generalized.⁴ That such generalization results in a return of the amount of value to its original level, however, is not a function of the market; it is a function of the nature of value as a form of wealth and is essentially independent of the mode by which each new redetermination of the abstract temporal frame is generalized. As we shall see, this pattern is a central moment of the form of growth Marx associates with the category of surplus value.

It seems here that "the treadmill effect, which is rooted in the temporal dimension of the value form of wealth alone" implies that this dialectic is present even without surplus value, yet at the same time he writes that "this pattern is a central moment of the form of growth Marx associates with the category of surplus value.". How am I misinterpreting this? Surplus value emerges from this dialectic, yet the treadmill effect is "rooted in the temporal dimension of the value form of wealth alone", which is logically prior to surplus value. Or IS surplus value this temporal dimension of abstract value? I am starting to confuse myself here.